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Abstract. Physical Unclonable Functions can be used for secure key generation in
cryptographic applications. It is explained how methods from coding theory must
be applied in order to ensure reliable key regeneration. Based on previous work,
we show ways how to obtain better results with respect to error probability and
codeword length. Also, an example based on Generalized Concatenated codes is
given, which improves upon used coding schemes for PUFs.
1 Introduction
Two of the most challenging tasks when developing a cryptosystem are to imple-
ment secure key generation and storage [1,2]. Keys have to be random, unique
and unpredictable. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) possess an intrinsic
randomness due to process variations during manufacturing. In addition, the
key is also implicitly stored in the PUF. However, the results when regenerating
a key vary, which can be interpreted as errors. Thus, error correction must be
used in order to compensate this effect.
Previous work on this topic used standard constructions, e.g. a concatenated
scheme of a BCH and Repetition code in [3], which can be improved. The
intention of this paper is to propose better code constructions for the application
in PUFs. The main requirements for the codes are low decoding complexity
and high error correction capability.
In the remainder of the paper we first explain PUF basics and how coding
theory is used for key generation using PUFs. Section 3 describes methods
and codes suitable for this scenario. Finally, an example code construction,
improving those commonly used for PUFs, is given in Section 4. The last
section concludes the paper.
2 2 PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
2 Physical Unclonable Functions
[4] describes a PUF as a physical entity which uses an input (challenge) in
order to produce an output (response), where a challenge can result in dif-
ferent responses when applied to a certain PUF instance several times. The
distance of two such responses is called intra-distance1. Reasons for these vary-
ing responses are random noise, measurement uncertainties, aging and changing
environmental conditions like temperature or supply voltage. A small response
intra-distance is preferred, since in applications there is a need for reproducibil-
ity of responses. Similarly, we can apply the same challenge to two different
PUF instances and call the distance of the responses inter-distance, which re-
sults from variations during the manufacturing process. This measure gives
us the distinguishability of different PUF instances, which is preferred to be
large. Unclonable means the hardness of manufacturing a PUF with a specific
challenge-response-behavior. There are many possibilities to realize PUFs, e.g.
delay-based (e.g. Ring Oscillator PUFs) or memory-based (e.g. SRAM PUFs).
An overview of popular types can be found in [5].
PUFs can be used in order to realize secure key generation and storage
for cryptographic applications. Due to the static randomness over the PUFs
lifetime, it is possible to regenerate a key repeatedly instead of storing it per-
manently. As described above, PUF responses are not exactly reproducible and
therefore a response cannot be used as key directly. Hence, methods of coding
theory must be used to circumvent this drawback. A common way to do this
is Secure Sketching [4]. When a key is generated the first time using a PUF
response y, a Sketch function is used to extract and store helper data ω of y.
A possible realization of such a function can use the syndrome of a linear code
as helper data, i.e. ω = HyT , where H is a parity check matrix of the code.
Since the syndrome contains only information about the difference to the next
codeword, an attacker knowing the helper data is left with an uncertainty as
large as the number of codewords. For regenerating a key, the same challenge
must be used to obtain a response y′ which is likely to differ from y. For most
PUFs, this can be interpreted as an additive error y′ = y + e, resulting from a
binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability p, where p is given
by the PUF. If dH (y, y
′) is small enough, a Recover function (cf. Algorithm 1)
is able to recover the key y using y′ and ω.
Algorithm 1 Recover
Require: y′ = y + e and ω = HyT
s = Hy′T − w = HeT
Use decoder to obtain e from s.
return y′′ = y′ − e
1With distance we mean the Hamming distance dH.
3There are different possibilities for realizing a Secure Sketch based on error-
correcting codes, for example the syndrome construction presented above. Other
possibilities are the Code-Offset Construction [5], Index-Based Syndrome cod-
ing [6], Complementary Index-Based Syndrome coding [7] and Differential Se-
quence Coding [8].
The main challenge is to find good codes that can be used for Secure
Sketches. Since PUF responses are not uniformly distributed, the generated
keys are often hashed by a cryptographic hash function before they are used.
The combination of a Secure Sketch and a hash function is usually referred to
as Fuzzy Extractor.
3 Code Constructions
We first give constraints one has to deal with when designing codes for PUFs.
Since decoding is usually implemented on a hardware device, there are con-
straints regarding time and area optimization. Also, the designed codes must
be binary. A typical constraint is to design a code which has a block error
probability Perr smaller than a certain threshold for a given BSC crossover
probability p. The dimension of the code must be greater than or equal to the
length of the key that should be generated. The length of the codewords can
be chosen arbitrarily, but one has to keep in mind that for generating one key,
as many bits as the codeword length have to be extracted from the PUF. In
this section, we describe construction and decoding methods which are suitable
for this scenario.
3.1 Reed–Muller Codes
A Reed–Muller (RM) code RM(r,m) of order r with r ≤ m is a binary linear
code with parameters n = 2m, k =
∑r
i=0
(
m
i
)
and d = 2m−r. RM codes work
well for PUF Secure Sketching due to an easily implementable decoding, e.g. [9].
Simplex codes are RM codes with parameters (1,m).
3.2 Generalized Minimum Distance Decoding
Generalized Minimum Distance (GMD) decoding (cf. [10]) is a method to in-
crease the number of correctable errors beyond half the minimum distance by
incrementally declaring the least reliable positions of a received word to be
erasures. Hence, soft-information and error-erasure decoders are needed.
3.3 Generalized Concatenated Codes
The authors of [11] found that concatenated codes are advisable for implement-
ing Secure Sketches. Instead of ordinary concatenated codes, we propose using
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Generalized Concatenated (GC) codes as introduced in [12, 13]. A GC code
with given n and d contains more codewords and hence has a higher code rate
than an ordinary concatenated code with the same parameters.
The main idea of GC codes is to partition an inner code B(1) into multiple
levels of subcodes. Let B
(i)
j denote the j-th subcode at partition level i. The goal
is to create partitions such that the minimum distances of the subcodes increase
strictly monotonically from level to level in the partition tree. Each codeword
of B(1) can be uniquely determined using a numeration of the partition. This
numeration is protected by outer codes. CodeA(i) denotes the outer code which
protects the numeration of the partition from level i to level i+1. For a detailed
description of GC codes we refer to [13].
4 Example
In [3], a design for cryptographic key generators based on PUFs was introduced,
using a concatenation of a (318, 174, 35) BCH code and a (7, 1, 7) Repetition
code in order to generate a 128 bit key with error probability 10−9.
In this section we want to give an example code construction for the same
scenario which improves existing schemes in code length, block error probability
and easiness of the implementation. As error model we choose a BSC with
crossover probability p = 0.14. We want to generate a 128 bit key. Thus, we
have to choose a code with dimension ≥ 128 and a block length less than the
one used in [3], namely 2226. The block error probability Perr should be less
than 10−9.
We choose a generalized concatenation of an inner (16, 5, 8) Simplex code
B(1) and RM codes of length 128 as outer codes A(i). Hence, we obtain a code
of length 128 · 16 = 2048, i.e. it can be represented as a matrix with 128 rows,
each containing a codeword of the Simplex code.
The inner code B(1) is partitioned into 16 disjoint subcodes B
(2)
i with pa-
rameters (16, 1, 16), e.g. B
(2)
0000 can be the repetition code of length 16 and
all other elements of the partition are its distinct cosets. The enumeration
i ∈ {0000, . . . , 1111} is then protected by four RM(128, 8, 64) codes, one for
each bit. Since the subcodes B
(2)
i contain exactly two elements each, we can
again partition them into subcodes containing only one element, B
(2)
i,0 and B
(2)
i,1 .
The enumeration {0, 1} is then protected by a RM(128, 99, 8) code. Thus, we
can encode 4 · 8 + 99 = 131 ≥ 128 bits.
We decode in two steps. First, we apply Maximum Likelihood (ML) decod-
ing2 of the B(1) code to each row of the codeword matrix. If we cannot decode
uniquely, we declare this row to be an erasure. Otherwise, we decode (i.e. save
the information word of length 5) and also save the Hamming distance of the
2This can be done easily since B(1) contains only 32 codewords
5received column to the decoding output as reliability information. After apply-
ing this to every of the 128 rows, we obtain a 128×5 matrix containing either 5
bits of information or erasures in each row. Then, we apply GMD decoding of
the RM(128, 8, 64) code, using the reliability information given by the number
of errors corrected before, to each of the first four columns of the matrix. If
decoding does not fail, we obtain the correct enumeration i ∈ F42 of the subcode
B
(2)
i for each row.
Thus, for each row, we know in which subcode B
(2)
i we have to decode in
the second step. Since B
(2)
i contains only two elements, we can again apply
ML decoding and obtain one bit for each row of the matrix, including soft
information like in the first step, or an erasure. Then we can apply GMD
decoding of the RM(128, 99, 8) code to get the fifth column of the ”information
matrix”.
Besides theoretical analysis, simulations have shown that for a BSC with
p = 0.14, the block error probability is reduced to 5.37·10−10. We also decreased
the codeword length from 2226 to 2048. Another advantage of our construction
is that decoding is easier to implement, since we only use codes with decoders
working over F2. Table 4 summarizes the improvements.
Code Perr Length Largest Field
3
[3] ≈ 10−9 2226 F28 (BCH)
New ≈ 5.37 · 10−10 2048 F2
Table 1: Improvements of the new code construction compared to [3].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We explained how coding theory is used for regenerating cryptographic keys
using PUFs. Moreover, we proposed code constructions and decoding methods
which improve existing coding schemes for PUFs and illustrated these by giv-
ing an example. RM codes turn out to be efficient in this scenario. However,
their rates cannot be chosen arbitrarily, which would improve the design op-
portunities for GC codes. Hence, for example generalized concatenation using
Reed–Solomon codes as outer codes can be used. In addition, more methods
from coding theory can be examined for suitability in this setting.
3Largest field used by decoder. Operations over small fields are usually easier to implement.
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